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LIST OF PARTIES

Jack

Hyrum

Hallett

is

the

Appellant,

and

was

the

Defendant in the original Trial Court.
The State of Utah is the Respondent herein and was the
Plaintiff in the original Trial Court.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

)
)
)

SUPPLEMENTAL
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.

)

CASE NO:

JACK HYRUM HALLETT,

)
)
)

PRIORITY: 2

Plaintiff/Respondent,

Defendant/Appellant.

890215-CA

An Appeal from a Judgment of the Seventh
Judicial District Court of
Duchesne County, State of Utah
Honorable Richard C. Davidson, Presiding

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from seven felony convictions in the
District Court of Duchesne County, The Honorable Richard C.
Davidson, Presiding.

A Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

was granted by the Honorable Davis S. Young and the State
appealed

that Writ.

This

Court

after hearing

determined

that pursuant to State v. Jackson, 635 P. 2d 36, the Defendant below should be granted a direct appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
RE: CASE NO. 1149
On

January

6,

1984, the Appellant

was

charged

with

Forcible Sexual Abuse, a Second Degree felony at Roosevelt,

Utah, on or about January

, 1984.

(R-3) .

Preliminary

hearing was held on January 26, 1984, and the Appellant was
bound over to District Court.

(R-l)

He was arraigned on

February 14, 1984, (R-18) , and trial was set for May 17,
1984.

(R-16)

On March 21, 1984, the Appellants attorney,

Anthony J. Famulary, filed a "Withdrawal of Counsel".
On
alleging

May

3,

the

1984,

same

offense

to

"from

(R-20)

At

trial

an

Amended

offense
March,
the

but
1983

alleged

Information

changed
to

the

early

was

date

January,

victim, April

tified, starting at R-88 and ending at R-100.

filed
of

the

1984".

Cordle, tesShe testified

that she did not know how many times she was touched but it
was more than once and

less than

pages R-94 & 95, April discussed

ten times.

(R-93)

two touchings.

On

One was

approximately two weeks prior to October 17, 1984, and the
other was approximately two weeks prior to that.
of April's

testimony

is

completely

void

of

The record

any

incident

between March, 1983 and January, 19 84.
The record

(Case No. 1149) is completely void of any

reference to the Appellant being arraigned on the Amended
Information.

The record

is void

of any

information

that

would indicate that the Appellant even knew of its existence
and

furthermore,

he

was

not

hearing nor did he waive one.
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offered

a

new

preliminary

STATEMENT OF FACTS
RE;

CASE NOS. 84CR99D, 84CR100D, 84CR101D,
84CR102, 84CR103D, 84CR104D

On October 17, 1984, trial was scheduled on Case No.
1149.

The alleged victim and her mother did not appear and

the case was continued.

(R-25)

On October 18, 1984, the Appellant was charged in the
above

six cases.

(Four witness

tampering

charges, Third

Degree felonies and two sex abuse charges) .
Since Mr. James R. Hall had been appointed to represent
Mr. Hallett on October 9, 1984, (R-27), he was also appointed to represent Mr. Hallett on the six new charges.

Mr.

Hallett was arrested on October 18, 1984, arraigned on the
six new charges and the Court ordered preliminary hearings
immediately
49, 6 1 ) .

following the arraignment.

(R-2, 11, 25, 37,

There is nothing in the record to indicate that

Mr. Hallett waived any right to having a reasonable time to
prepare

for

a preliminary

hearing,

and

there

is

no

in-

dication that his attorney objected to the immediate preliminary hearing.
In addition, the two new sex abuse charges

(84CR103)

and (84CR104) were charged as Third Degree felonies.
bound

over

on Third

Degree

felonies

and

at

the

He was
time

of

trial, and after a jury waiver, the Prosecutor made a motion

-3-

to amend to Second Degree felonies.

Mr. Hallett's attorney

did not object.
Mr. Hallet was arraigned in District Court on October
22, 1984, and went to trial on all seven charges on October
31, 1984, just 13 days after he was charged.
The trial record
about

trying

all

(R-3 & 4) includes

seven

cases

together.

some discussion
Mr. Hallett

was

present during these discussions but did not say anything
and it is very clear that he was not informed of a right to
separate

trial

on

each

of

the

sex

abuse

cases

separate trials on the four tampering charges.
Hall stipulated that a Mr
ified psychologist.

and

two

Also, Mr.

Lawren^-, Szaraniec was a qual-

(TR-61).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
TESTIMONY

Carolyn

Chapman,

a

former

member

of

the

Sheriff!s

office, testified at Appellant's trial (Tr. 68 to 73) about
her conversations with April Cordle
told her.

and

the things April

Chapmanfs testimony from page 69, line 6 to page

72, line 8 was all hearsay

from either April or April's

mother, Francis.
Mr. Thomas Harrison added additional hearsay from April
(Tr. 21, line 25) as follows:
Yes, April explained an inappropriate sexual relationship between she and

-4-

her mother's boyfriend, and asking her
who her mother's boyfriend was, she
stated Mr. Jack Hallett.
Additional testimony by Mr. Harrison involving hearsay
(Tr. 28 & 29) is as follows:
A.
Yes, April shared with me that
Mr. Hallett would touch her under her
clothing, and she showed me that behavior with the use we used the dolls. We
use dolls with clothing on, and she
showed me that behavior.
She talked
about him touching her under her clothing with his hand on her chest and she
pointed to her breast. She touched her
breast as well as her genitalia, and she
pointed and touched down to her genital
area, to her vulva and mons area. She,
in investigating it further, showed
absolutely
no
sign
of
insertion
vaginally.
It was a genital fondling
that she shared with me, no vaginal
insertion.
Q.
Did April share with you any
of her feelings about an ongoing physical relationship without the particular
fondling?
A.

Yes, she did.

Q.

What was the nature of that?

A.
She shared with me that Mr.
Hallett would hold her, what she called,
to quote her, "squeeze me like lovers
hug, not daddy's hug."
When I asked her what that meant
she said, "He would hug me real tight
and press me real close to him and not
let me go."
April's mother, Francis Cordle, also testified
conversations with April as follows (Tr. 52) :

-5-

about

Q.
When April first talked to you
did she describe what Jack had done to
her?
A,

Yes.

Q.

What did she say?

Mr. Hall: There
again
I
object to any hearsay testimony.
The Court:
Overruled.
The Witness:

Rule
What

would

76-5-411.
was

the

ques-

tion?
Q.
(By Mr. Draney) What did she
tell you Jack had done to her?
A.
She said she was laying in bed
and he came in and put his hands down in
her pajamas and then on her breasts,
too.
Q.
pajamas,
was?

When you
say
don
in her
did she indicate where that

A.

Yes.

Q.

Was it in the crotch area?

A.

Yes.

At the time of trial, April Cordle was 19 years of age
(Tr. 70).

Substantial hearsay testimony was admitted under

Title 76-5-411 based on testimony of Lawrence Szaraniec that
April

was

of

about

9% years

mentally

(Tr.

12) .

Title

76-5-411 at the time of trial referred to a child under 10.
Utah has not ruled whether 76-5-411 means chronological age
or mental age.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The Trial Court

imposed

an

illegal

sentence by

delegating to the Division of Corrections the determination
of consecutive versus concurrent sentences.

Case

2.

Appellant was denied competent counsel.

3.

Appellant was denied his rights to due process in

1149 when

the charge was

amended

after

preliminary

hearing.
4.

Mental age as opposed to chronological age does

not permit hearsay evidence pursuant to 76-5-411.

ARGUMENTS

POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT IMPOSED AN ILLEGAL
SENTENCE BY DELEGATING TO THE DIVISION
OF CORRECTIONS THE DETERMINATION OF
CONSECUTIVE VERSUS CONCURRENT SENTENCES.
As a part of the Trial Courtfs "Commitment Order" (Rec.
P-8), the Court ordered as follows:
The Court declined to determine whether
the aforementioned sentence should be
consecutively or concurrent and leaves
that decision to the Division of Corrections.
The Utah State law governing concurrent versus consecutive sentences is set forth in Title 76-3-401(1) U.C.A. 1953
as follows:

-7-

(1) Subject to the limitations of
subsections (2) through (5) , a court
shall determine, if a defendant has been
adjudged guilty of more than one felony
offense, whether to impose concurrent or
consecutive sentences for the offenses.
Sentences shall run concurrently unless
the court states, in the sentence, that
they shall run consecutively.
Article V of the Constitution of Utah reads as follows:
The powers of the government of the
State of Utah shall be divided into
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial;
and no person charged with the exercise
of powers properly belonging to one of
these departments, shall exercise any
functions appertaining to either of the
others, except in the cases herein
expressly directed or permitted.
The Trial Courr in leaving that decision to the discretion of the Division of Corrections violated the Defendant's rights pursuant to the above statute and Article by
delegating to the Executive branch of government a matter
that is strictly a Judicial function.
Had the Court merely not stated whether the sentences
would be consecutive or concurrent, they would be deemed to
run concurrent, 76-3-401 U.C.A., but by sentencing in the
manner he did, the Division of Corrections would probably
feel

they

had

the

apparent

power

consecutively.
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to

run

the

sentences

POINT II.
APPELLANT WAS DENIED COMPETENT COUNSEL.
(A)
Trial counsel stipulated that a Mr. Lawrence Szaraniec
was a qualified'psychologist.
Title

58-25-(1-12)

psychologists.
Department

(TR-61)

U.C.A,

governs

the

licensing

of

Counsel for Appellant checked with the Utah

of Business

Regulations

and was

they have no record of a Lawrence Szaraniec.

informed

that

Mr. Szaraniec

testified he was the psychologist for the Duchesne County
School District
contend
that

that he is exempt under 58-25-6 U.C.A., however,

exemption

stricted

(TR-60), and therefore the Respondent may

to

would

the

require

that

"educational

his

activities

institution".

That

follows with emphasis added:
58-25-6. Exemption from operation of
chapter.
This chapter does not limit the
activities and the use of an official
title on the part of a person who has
not obtained a license and is in the
employ of a federal agency or a duly
chartered educational institution, if
those activities are a part of the
duties in his salaried position, and if
those activities are performed solely on
behalf of a federal agency or the
educational
institution.
Any
person
employed as a psychologist by a state,
county, or municipal agency or other
political
subdivision
of
the
state
before July 1, 1981, and who maintains
employment in the same state, county, or
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be restatute

municipal agency or other political
subdivison, may continue to use the
official
title without
obtaining
a
license to practice psychology in this
state. This chapter does not limit the
activities and services of a student,
intern,
or
resident
in
psychology,
pursuing a course of study at an accredited educational institution recognized
by the division as providing qualified
training and experience for psychologists, if those activities and services
constitute a part of his supervised
course of study, and if that person is
designated by such titles as "psychological intern," "psychological trainee," or other title clearly indicating
his training status. This chapter does
not prevent members of other professions
from doing work of a psychological
nature if those persons do not represent
themselves
to the public
as being
psychologists, except w-ien so licensed.
April Cordle was 19 years old

in 1984

(TR-70) .

Mr.

Szaraniec's testimony was critical because he testified that
April's chronological age was between eight and a third and
nine and on-half years.

(TR-63)

The obvious purpose for

such testimony was to dispute any question of consent.
Consent is a primary question since from the time Mr.
Hallett was originally charged

(January, 1984) to the time

of trial, April Cordle and her mother continued to live with
Mr. Hallett.

(TR-113)

At the time of submitting this Brief, documentation has
not been received as to the fact that Mr. Szaraniec is not
licensed.

As soon as it is received it will be submitted to

the Court as a supplement to the Brief.
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(B)
We would contend that when an attorney is assigned to a
case on October 9, 1984 (Case 1149) and six more charges are
filed on October

18, 1984, and the attorney allows those

cases to go directly into preliminary hearing and then to
trial 13 days later, that he did not have sufficient time to
prepare

for

trial.

There

is

no

indication

anything to rebutt the psychological testimony.

that

he

did

Plaintiff's

Exhibit 7-P, pages 4 and 5 indicate that there was a Stipulation between Mr. Hall and Mr. Draney to hold the preliminary hearing

immediately

and even though Mr. Hallett was

there, there is nothing on the record to indicate that he
was consulted.
Title 77-35-7 U.C.A. sets forth the procedure before a
magistrate.

Specifically

subsection

(4)(v)

states

as

follows:
The magistrate shall thereupon allow the
defendant
reasonable
time,
and
opportunity
to consult with counsel
before proceeding further...
There was nothing in the record of the arraignment and
preliminary hearing to show that Mr. Hallett was advised of
additional time to prepare.

It should also be kept in mind

that Mr. Hallett testified at the Habeas Corpus hearing that
at that time he only had an eighth grade education.
of Habeas Corpus Transcript.)
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(Page 9

(C)
The Appellant was entitled to three separate trials on
the Sexual Abuse charges and two separate trials on the four
tampering charges.
Mr. Hall did not effectively represent his client in
combining all those charges for one trial.
cal effect of hearing

seven different

The psychologi-

cases

at one

time

could substantially affect the most unbiased of Judges.
We recognize that the Appellant carries the burden of
showing ineffective counsel.
270.

This Court

State v. Pursefell, 746 P. 2d

in State v Pursefell;

supra, held

that

serious lack of preparation could give rise to a violation
of a Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel.

POINT III.
APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO DUE
PROCESS IN CASE 1149 WHEN THE CHARGE WAS
AMENDED AFTER PRELIMINARY HEARING.
The record in Case No. 1149 is void of any reference to
advising the Defendant of the amendment or his right to a
new preliminary hearing.
period of ten months
case.

In addition, it gave the State a

(march through December) to prove a

Defense counsel did not request a Bill of Particulars

to the down time and therefore could not have given thought
to a possible alibi defense.
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POINT IV.
MENTAL AGE AS OPPOSED TO CHRONOLOGICAL
AGE DOES NOT PERMIT HEARSAY EVIDENCE
PURSUANT TO 76-5-411.
The State of Washington has ruled in a similar situation chronological age and not mental age is the determining
factor when considering competency of a witness.

State v.

Smith, 650 P.2d 201 (Wash. 1982) at 202 states as follows:
According to her theory the patient was,
in law, a child within the meaning of
CrR 6.12(c). We recently held in State
v. Froehlich, 96 Wash,2d 301, 635 P.2d
127 (1981), that RCW 5,60.050(2), which
is couched in the same language as CrR
6.12(c), except that the rule applies to
all children while the statute applies
only to children under 10 years of age,
cannot be read to apply to persons over
10 years old. It was contended there,
as it is here, that an adult should be
regarded as a child, in law, if his
mental development is comparable.
The
rule, like the statute, applies only to
those who fall within its terms.
A

similar holding came from the New Mexico Court of

Appeals in State v. Doe, 642 P.2d 201 at 204:
[7] The numerous references to age
in the children!s code are references to
years of age, not mental age. See §§
32-1-3(A)
and
(B),
32-1-9(A),
32-l-19(C) ,
32-1-20 (A) ,
32-1-27(1) ,
32-1-29(A)(1), 32-1-30(A)(1), N.M.S.A.
1978 (1981 Repl.Supp.). A "year" is a
period of solar days. Webster's Third
New International Dictionary, (1966).
Compare Matter of Doe, 89 N.M. 507, 554
P.2d 669 (Ct.App. 1976) .
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[8,9]
The age of fifteen years
means the passage of fifteen of the
units of time which are called years.
Paragraph F does not refer to "mental
age," and does not exclude use of the
admissions and statements made by the
child to the three witnesses.
Although State v. Nelson, 113 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (July
25, 19 89) did not deal with mental age versus chronological
age, Justice Howe did hold as follows:
Defendant
lastly
contends
that
the
out-of-court statement of the victim
should not have been admitted at trial.
At the time of trial, Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-411
allowed
the
admission
of
out-of-court statements made by alleged
victims of sexual abuse who were under
twelve years of age pursuant to Utah
Code Anno. § 77-35-15.5(11, (2) or (3)
(Supp. 1989) (amended 1988). Since the
victim in this case was thirteen, that
section
was
inapplicable.
(emphasis
added)
As noted in Appellant's original brief, April offei~ed
no

testimony

concerning

viction

on

that

hearsay

is

in violation

Case Number

charge was
of

1149, therefore con-

completely
Title

on

hearsay.

76-5-411

and

Such

State

v.

Nelson, (supra).
Lawrence Szaraniec in addition to not being certified
(See original Brief), gave testimony as to April's truthfulness

(Tr. 15) contrary to the foundational requirements of

State v. Rimmasch, 108 Utah Adv. Rep. 20.

Although Appel-

lant's

to

attorney

stipulated

(improperly)
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Szaraniec1s

qualifications as a psychologist there was never any testimony as to his qualifications at determining the truthfulness of a witness.
CONCLUSION
We would

respectfully

submit

that the Appellant was

denied his Sixth Amendment right to competent counsel.

We

further contend that the record speaks for itself on that
issue and his conviction should be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY

SUBMITTED

this

^ y

day

of

1989.

H. DON SHA^P
Attorney for
Defendant/Appellant
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October,
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